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850 CONNOR t'. GREAT WESTERN SAV. & LOAN ASSN. [69 C.2d 
[L. A. No. 28698. In Bank. Dec. 12, 1968.] 
·RA YMOND E. CONNOR et aI., Plaintiffs, Cross-defendants 
and Appellants, v. GREAT WESTERN SAVINGS AND 
I.JOAN ASSOCIArrION, Defendant, Cross-defendant and 
Respondent; MEYER PRITKIN et ai., Defendants, 
Cross-complainants and Appellants. 
[L.A. No. 28699. In Bank. Dec. 12, 1968.] 
JAMES L. BURGESS et aI., Plaintiffs, Cross-defendants and 
Appellants, v. GREAT WESTERN SAVINGS AND 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, Defendant, Cross-defendant and . 
Respondent; MEYER PRITKIN et at, Defendants, 
Cross-complainants and Appellants. 
(Consoli"dated Appeals.) 
[1] Nonsuit-Appeal-Consideration of Eviden~Rest on Re-
view.-On appeal from a judgment of nonsuit in favor of 
defendant, review must gh'e to plaintiff's evidence all the 
value to which it is legally entitled, must recognize every 
legitimate infel'ence that may be drawn from that evidence, 
and must disregard conflicting evidence, and if there is evi-
dence that would support a finding against defendant on any 
of the grounds set forth hy plaintiff, re"ersal of the nonsuit 
judgment is required. 
[2] Joint Adventurers - Definition and Nature: Words and 
Phrases-Joint Venture.-A joint venture exists when there 
is an agreement between the parties under which they have a 
cOmmunity of interest, that is, a joint interest, in a COllllllon 
business undertaking, an undcrstanding as to the sharing of 
profits and losses, and the right of joint control. 
[3] Id. - Relationship Under Agreements for Subjlivision, 
Development and Improvement of Realty.-No joint venture 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Dismissal and Nonsuit, § 58; Am.Jur.2d, 
A ppeal and Error, § 886. 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Joint Ad\'euturers, § 2; Am.Jur., Joint Ad-
\'l'lIture1'S (rev ed § 2 et seq). 
,:HcX. Dig. References: [1] Dismissal, Discontinuance, and Non-
lmit, §81(2)(1l); [2] Joint Adventurers, §1; Words and Phrases; 
[3] Joint Adventurers, §3(10); [4] Building and Loan Associ-
ations, § 3; [5, 8-13, 15, 16, 18, 19] Building and Loan Associ-
atiolls, ~2,3; [0,7] Negligelu',', ~5; 114] Courts, §91; [17] Negli-
gence, § 16(4). 
-Reporter's Note: These ealles were previoulily entitled, "Conner v. 
COllejo Valley DeveluplIl!'nt Co," 111111 "Bu/'gcHIi v. COllejo Valley Devel-
OIlmont Co." 
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or joint enterprise existed between a tract developer and home 
builder and a savings and loan lender furnishing the principal 
financing for land acquisition, home construction and home 
purchase, and there was no evidence of a community 01' joint 
interest in the undertaking, where, although the evidence 
established that the de,'eloper-builder and the lender combined 
their property, skill and knowledge to carry out the develop-
ment in which each shared control, anticipating substantial 
profit and cooperating in development, the lender participated 
as a buyer and seller of land and lender of funds, the 
developer-builder participated as a builder and seller of homes, 
neither was to share in the profits or losses that the other 
might realize or suffer, although the profits of each were 
dependent on the development's success, and neither bad an 
interest in payments received by the other. 
[4] Building and Loan AssoCiations-Members-Duty of Associ-
ation to Shareholders.-A savings and loan lender furnishing 
the principal financing to a tract developer and home builder 
for land acquisition, home construction, and ultimate hOllle 
purchase, with the right to extensive control of the enterprise, 
whose financing took on ramifications beyond the usual money-
lenders' domain by actiye participation in the hOllle construc-
tion enterprise, violated its duty of care to its shareholders to 
exercise its powers of control to prevent defective home con-
struction where it knew or should have known of the developer's 
inexperience and dangerously thin capitalization, and thnt 
damage from attempts to cut corners was a risk reasonably 
to be foreseen, failed to make soil tests, examine foundation 
plans, or recommend changes in pre-packaged plans and speci-
fications, and made no attempt to discover or remedy gross 
structural defects discoverable on reasonable inspection, but 
relied on building inspectors with whom it had had no experi-
ence to enforce a building code of which it was ignorant. 
[5a-5c] Id.-Liability-Negligence in Home Construction.-A say-
ings and loan association lender furnishing the principal 
financing to a tract developer and home builder for land acqui-
sition, home construction, and ultimate home purcl18se, with 
t1l.e right to extensive control of the enterprise, was under a 
duty to the buyers of the homes to exercise reasonable care t() 
protect them from damages caused by major structural home 
defects and to prevent thc sale of seriously defective homes to 
them, and the fact that it was not in pri,-ity of contract· with 
the home buyers except as a lender for home purchases, did 
not absolve it of liability for its own negligence in creating an 
unreasonable risk of harm to them where the lender's transac-
[5] See Oa1.Jur.2d, Building and Loan Associations, § 25; Am. 




852 CoNNOR V. GREAT WESTERN SAV. & LOAN ASSN. [690.2<1 
tions were intended to affect the home buyers significantly, the 
lender could ressonably have foreseen the risk of harm to the 
home buyers, it was certain that the home buyers suffered 
injury, the injury suffered by the home buyers WI\S closely 
connected with the lender's conduct, substantial moral blame 
attached to the lendel"s conduct, and the admonitory policy of 
the law of t~rts called for the imposition of liability on the 
lender for its conduct. 
[6] Negligence-Elemente-Basis of Duty-Contract.-Privity of 
eontract is not necessary to establish the existence of a duty 
to exercise ordinary care not to injure another, but such duty 
may arise out of a voluntarily assumed relationship if public 
policy dictates the existence of such a duty. 
[7] Id, - Elements - Basis of Duty - Contract. - Whether a 
defendnnt will be held liable to a third person not in privity is 
a matter of policy and involves the balancing of various 
factors, among which are tbe extent to which the transaction 
was intended to affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability of hann 
to him, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered 
injury, the eloseness of tile connection between the defend-
ant's conduct and the injuries suffered, th~ moral blame 
attached to defendant's conduct, and the policy of preventing 
future harm. 
[8] Building and Loan Associatione-Liability.-The transactions 
of a savings and lonn association lender furnishing the princi-
pal financing to a tract developer and home builder for land 
aequisition, home construction, and ultimate home purchase, 
were intended to affect the home buyers significantly where 
the success of its transactions with the developer-builder 
depended on their ability to induce the home buyers to pur-
chase homes in the tract and to finance the purchases with its 
funds, where its funding agreement was on condition of mini-
mum prior commitments to buy homes, where it w&l'ehoused 
land for the developer-builder on the understanding that the 
land would be used for a residential subdivision, where ad-
vances from the construction loans were to be used by the 
developer-build Ct· to exercise repurchase options providing 
capital gain to the lender, and where the lender had the 
developer-buihler channel home buyers to it for loans and re-
ceivetl a loan fee from the developer-builder in the process. 
[9] Id.-Liability-Negligence.-A savings and loan association 
lender furnishing the principal financing to a tract developer 
and home builder for land aequisition, home construction and 
home purchase, could reasonably have foreseen the risk of 
harm to home buyers where it knew or should have known the 
developer-build~r had never developed a tract of similar 
magnitude, and WIlS operating on a dangerously thin capital-
iZlltioll creating a risk of corner cutting in construction, 
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further enlarged by the additional pressures on the developer-
builder ensuing from onerous burdens as a borrower froll! the 
savings and loan association lender. 
[10] Id. - Liability - Negligence. - In consolidated home buyers' 
damage actions against a savings and loan association lender 
furnishing the principal. financing for land acquisition, home 
construction and home purchase in the development of a tract, 
for negligent home construction, it was certain that plaintiffs 
suffered injury where counsel stipulated that each of the plain-
tiff homeowners, if called, would testify that their respectiye 
homes sustained damage in varying degrees of the character 
concerned in the action, and where sufficient evidence was pre· 
sented to show by way of example the existence of damage to 
the homes and therefore injury to plaintiffs. 
[11] Id.-Liability-Negligence.-The injury suffered by home 
buyers, plaintiffs in consolidated damage actions against a 
savings and loan association lender furnishing the principal 
financing for land acquisition, home construction and home 
purchase in the development of a tract, for negligent home 
construction was closely connected with defendant lcnder's 
conduct where it appeared that the lender pot only financed the 
development of the tract but controlled the course it would 
take, and that had it exercised reasonable care in the exercise 
of its control, it would have discovered that the pre-packaged 
plans purchased by the developer-builder required correction 
and would have withheld financing until the plans were cor-
rected. 
[12] Id. - Liability - Negligence. - Substantial moral blame 
attached to the conduct of a savings and loan association 
lender furnishing the principal financing to a tract developer 
and home builder for land acquisition, home construction, And 
home purchase, with the right to extensive control of the 
enterprise, where the value of the security for the lenders 
construction loans as well as the projected security for its long-
term loans to home buyers depended on the soundness of con-
struction, where the lender failed of its obligation to its own 
shareholders when it failed to exercise reasonable care to pre-
clude major structural defects in the homes whose construc-
tion it financed and controlled, and where it also failed of its 
obligation to the home buyers to protect them agaim;t struc-
tural defects beyond their capacity to discover or remcdy. 
[13] Id. - Liability - Negligence. - Rules tending to discou rage 
misconduct are particularly appropriate when applied to an 
established industry j and the admonitory policy of the law of 
torts called for the imposition of liability to home buyers "II a 
savings and loan association lender furnishing the pril\t'il'al 
financing to a tract developer and home builder for laud H'"'lui. 
sition, home construction, and nltimate home purchaae, wit.h 
) 
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the right to extensive control of the enterprise, for its conduct 
where it voluntarily undertook business relationships with the 
developer-builder to develop the tract and to develop a market 
for the tract houses in which prospective buyers would be 
directed to the lender for their financing, thus becoming an 
active participant in a home construction enterprise in which 
it had the right to exercise extensive control, and where it neg-
ligently failed to exercise its powers of control over the enter-
prise to prevent the construction of defective homes. 
[14] Courts-Decisions-Duty to Follow Law.-In the absence of 
actual or prospective legislative policy, a court is free to and 
must resolve the case before it in terms of common law. 
[15] Building and Loan Associations-Liability-Negligence.-A 
rule imposing liability to home buyers on a savings and loan 
association lender furnishing the principal financing to a tract 
developer and home builder for land acquisition, home con-
struction, and ultimate home purchase, with the right to 
extensive control of the enterprise, for defective homc con-
struction and resultant damage, should not operate prospec-
tively only, lind considcrations of public policy do not prccludc 
retroactive effect. 
[16a., 16b] Id,-Lia.bility-Negligence.-Two separate acts of neg-
ligence may be the concUlTing proximate cause of an injury; 
thus a savings and loan association lender furnishing thc 
principal financing to a tract developer and home builder for 
land acquisition, home conshllction, and ultimate home pur-
chase, with the right to extensive control of the enterprise, 
was not insulated from liability to home buyers for defecti,'c 
home construction and resultant damage by any negligence of 
the developer-builder in constructing the homes or of county 
building inspectors in approving the construction, as supersed-
ing causes of the home buyers' injury, where the risk that the 
developer-builder's negligence might occur was the primary 
hazard giving rise to the lender's duty and where the negli-
gence of the huilding inspectors, confined to inspection, could 
not diminish or spirit away the lender's negligent failure to 
perform its duty to exercise reasonable care to protect home 
buyers from seriously defective construction whether caused 
by defective plans, inspection, or hoth. 
[17] Negligence - Proximate Cause - Foresight of Intervening 
Cause.-Jf the realizable likelihood that a third person may 
act in a particular nllmner is the hazard or one of the haz-
ards which makes the actor negligcnt, such an act whether 
innocent, negligent, intentionally tortious, or criminal does not 
prevent the IIctor from bt'ing liable for harm caused thereby, 
[18] Building and Loan Associations - Liability - Impairment of 
Junior Lienors Security. - In a ('J'Oss-action by pledgees of 
promissory notes secured by second deeds of trust on land in a 
) 
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tract development to hold a savings and loan lentler furnishing 
the principal financing to the tract developer and home buildel' 
liable for impairment of cross-complainants' security ('aused 
by damage to homes resultant from defective construction, and 
to impose liens on any recovery plaintiff home purchasers 
might otherwise obtain in their action against the lender and 
others, it was error to grant a nonsuit against cross-complain-
ant where, by stipulation and pretrial order, the parties agreed 
that the issue of the lender's liability should be determined 
first and that thereafter the rights and liabilities of the other 
parties among themselves should be determined, where the 
question of cross-complainants' entitlement to liens on any re-
coveries plaintiff might obtain from the lender had therefore 
not yet been litigated, and where in further proceedings, cross-
complainants might be able to establish some basis for sharing 
in plaintiffs' recoveries. 
[19] Id.-Liability-Negligence-To Whom Liable.-Neither a 
·savings and loan association lender furuishing the principal 
financing to a tract developer and home builder fOl' laud aCIlui-
sition, home construction, and ultimate home purchase, with a 
right to extensive control of the enterprise, nor pledgees of 
promissory notes secured by second junior deeds of trust Oil 
lands in the tract, were under a duty to exercise reasonable 
care to protect the other from the builder's negligence ill 
constructing defective homes where the foreseeability of harm 
to the pledgees as the result of defective construction was 
substantially less than in the case of home buyers, where the 
lender's negligence was more closely connected with home 
buyers' injuries than the pledgees, and where substantially less 
moral blame attached to the lender's conduct with 1'espect to 
the pledgees than attached to its conduct with respect to the 
home purchasers; and the saving and loan association lender's 
duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent the developer-
builder from constructing defective homes was limited to the 
members of the public who bought those homes. 
APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of Ven-
tura County. Robert R. Willard, Judge. Affirmed in part and 
reversed in part. 
Consolidated actions by homeowners for rescission and resti-
tution or alternative damages for losses resulting from de-
fective home construction. Judgment of nonsuit affirmed in 
part and reversed in part.· 
Harris K. Lyle, Edward L. Lascher,Lyle & Di Giuseppe 
and James Di Giuseppe for Plaintiffs, Cross-defendants and 
Appellants. 
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Overton, Lyman & Prince, Ernest E. Johnson, Phyllis M. 
Hix, John McClure and Lynn O. Poulson for Defendants, 
Cross-complainants and Appellants. 
Thomas L. Fike, Thomas Schneider, Cherie A. Gaines, Mark 
C. Peery, Fadem & Kanner, Jerrold D. Fadem, Ernest L. 
Graves and Gideon Kanner as Amici Curiae on behalf of 
Plaintiffs, Cross-defendants and Appellants and Defendants, 
Cross-complainants and Appellants. 
Swerdlow, Glikbarg & Shimer, Irving A. Shimer, Michael 
H. Shapiro and William D. Moore for Defendant, Cross-
defendant and Respondent. 
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Herbert E. Wenig, 
Assistant Attorney General, Anthony C_ Joseph, Deputy 
Attorney General, Kaplan, Livingston, Goodwin, Berkowitz & 
Selvin, Herman F. Selvin, Charles E. Jones, Landels, Ripley, 
Gregory & Diamond, Edward D. IJandels, Morrison, Foerster, 
Holloway, Clinton & Clark, Paul E. Homrighausen and Melvin 
R. Goldman as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant, Cross-
defendnnt and Respondent. 
'l'RA YNOR, C. J.-These consolidated appeals are from a 
judgment of nonsuit in favor of defendant Great Western 
Savings and Loan Association in two actions consolidated for 
trial. 
Plaintiffs in each action purchased single-family homes in 
a residential tract development known as Weathersfield, 
located on tracts 1158, 1159, and 1160 in Ventura County. 
Thereafter their homes suffered serious damage from crack-
ing caused by ill-designed foundations that could not with-
stand the expansion and contraction of adobe soil. Plaintiffs 
accordingly sought rescission or damages from the various 
parties involved in the tract development. 
Holders of promissory notes secured by second deeds of 
trust on the homes filed cross-complaints, alleging that their 
security had been impaired by the damage to the homes. 
They sought to impose liens on any recovery plaintiffs might 
obtain from other defendants. 
There was abundant evidence that defendant Conejo Val-
ley Development Company, which built and sold the homes, 
Jwgligf'ntly constructed them without rf'gard to soil condi-
tions prevalent at the site. Spf'cifically, it laid slab founda-
tions on adobe soil without taking proper precautions 
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recommended to it by soil engineers. When the adobe soil 
expanded during rainstorms two years later, the foundations 
cracked and their movement generated further damage. 
In addition to seeking damages from Conejo, plaintiffs 
sought to hold Great Western liable, either on the ground 
that its participation in the tract development brought it into 
a joint venture or a joint enterprise with Conejo, which 
served to make it vicariously liable, or on the ground that it 
breached an independent duty of care to plaintiffs. 
A brief review of the negotiations leading to Great West-
ern's role in the development of the 'Weathersfield tract is 
essential to a clear perspective of the issues. [1] Since the 
appeals are from a judgment of nonsuit, such a review must 
give to plaintiffs' evidence all the value to which it is legally 
entitled, must recognize every legitimate inference that may 
be drawn from that evidence, and must disregard conflicting 
evidence. (Raber v. Tumin (1951) 36 Ca1.2d 654, 656 [226 
. P.2d 574J ; Blumberg v. M. & T., Inc. (1949) 34 Ca1.2d 226, 
229 [209 P.2d 1J.) If there is evidence that would support a 
recovery against Great Western on either of the grounds set 
forth by plaintiffs, the judgment of nonsuit must be reversed. 
The Weathersfield project originated in December 1958, 
when Harris Goldberg, president of South Gate Development 
Company, undertook negotiations to purchase for South Gate 
547 acres of the McRea ranch, a parcel of approximately 
1,600 acres of undeveloped real property in the Conejo Val-
ley, which was then undergoing the beginnings of large-scalf! 
development. Goldberg and Keith Brown together owned and 
controlled South Gate Development Company. They planned 
to develop the property with the goal of creating a commu-
nity of approximately 2,000 homes. 
Neither Goldberg nor Brown had any significant experi-
ence in large-scale construction of tract housing. Goldberg 
had left the men's apparel business in 1955 to begin a career 
in real estate. He subsequently established a number of com-
panies that engaged principally in subdividing raw acreage. 
In 1958 he undertook the construction of a 31-home develop-
ment called Wa.verly Manor; when 15 or 20 homes had been 
partially completed under the supervision of a South Gate 
employee, he engaged Brown to supervise completion of the 
job. This task was Brown's first experience with tract COll-
struction, although he had been licensed as a general contrac-
tor in 1950 and had built approximately 50 single-family 
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In January 1959 South Gate signed an agreement to pur-
elJase 100 acres of the McRea ranch for $340,000 within 120 
days, and a conditional sales agreement to purchase 447 
adjoining acres for $2,500 per acre over a IO-year period. 
Neither South Gate nor Goldberg had the financial resources 
to perform these agreements, and in March Goldberg 
approached Great 'Western for thc necessary funds to pur-
chase the 100-acre parcel on which Weathersfield was to be 
constructed. 
Great Western processed between 8,000 and 9,000 loans 
each year, amounting to more than $100,000,000, but had not 
previously made loans in Ventura County. It expressed an 
interest to Goldberg in developing a volume of new construc-
tion loan business and in providing long-term financing in 
the form of first trust deeds to the buyers of the homes to be 
built. By the end of April, the general outlines of an agree-
ment with Goldberg had been dcveloped, and they were 
recorded in the minutes of Great Western's Loan Committee. 
During the ensuing four months the pa.rties and their law-
yers worked out the details of a transaction whereby Great 
Western would supply the funds neeessary to enable Gold-
berg to purchase the 100-acre parcel and construct homes 
thereon. In return, Great Western was given the right to 
make construction loans on the homes to be built and the 
right of first refusal to make long-term loans to the buyers of 
the homes. Before agreeing to provide money for the pur-
ehase of the land, Great Western also demanded and 
reeeived a "gentleman's agreement" that it would have the 
right of first refusal to make construction loans on tllC homes 
to be built on the adjoining 447-acre parceP 
Great Western emploYf'd a geologist to determine whethf'r 
an adequate quantity and quality of water would be avail-
able in the area. As a result of the geologist's report and its 
own investigations, Great Western further demanded and 
received a guarantee from South Gate, Goldberg, and Mr. 
and Mrs. Brown that if Great 'V f'stern held title to the 100-
acre pareel in September 1960, adf'quate water service lines 
from a new or existing public utility would be available at 
tIl(' property linf' for consumer use. 
Tn .July, Great Western provid!:'d the necessary funds for 
tlll' purehllse of the Weathf'rsnf'ld tract. Goldberg l18d depos-
ihl $HIO 000 of the *~40,000 pun'hase price with the escrow 
I Although Goldhcrg testified at the trial that he rejeeted Great West-
('1"11 's dt'll1an<l for snch a right of first. Tefn":!l, his testimony was to the 
('onl mry in a 106:; deposit.ioll that was also introduced. 
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agent on behalf of South Gate. He apparently obtained the 
money by draining assets from his corporations, leaving a 
combined net worth in those enterprises of $36,000 as of July 
31. 
Goldberg, by amended escrow instructions, substituted 
Conejo Development Company in place of South Gate as pur-
ehaser of the land from the McReas, and all funds deposited 
theretofore by South Gate were credited to Conejo. Conejo 
had been incorporated several months earlier, though with 
only $15,000 capital to handle the tract development. 
Great Western deposited the remaining $150,000 of the 
purchase price in a second escrow opened between Conejo as 
seller and Great Western as buyer, took title to the land from 
Conejo, and granted South Gate a one-year option to repur-
chase the land in three parcels for a total of $lBO,OOO. South 
Gate, Goldberg, and Mr. and Mrs. Brown agreed to repur-
chase the property hom Great Western on demand for 
$200,000 if the option \\'f're not exercised and adequate watcr 
facilities were not available by September 1960. 
The arrangement for the purchase of the land by Great 
Western was an early example of what has come to be known 
as "land warehousing." Under such an arrangement, a 
financial institution holds land for a developer until he is 
ready to use it. Unlike a normal bailee of personal property, 
however, the institution retains title to the property as well 
as the right to possession. 
At the outset Great Western confronted the problem that 
it could not lend Goldberg $150,000 outrigllt and still retain 
the land as security, for section 7155 of the Financial Code 
prohibited it from lending more than 331!:~ percent of the 
appraised value of unimproved property.2 It therefore 
sought to circumvent the specific statutory prohibition by 
disguising what was in substance admittedly a loan as the 
kind of investment in real property that was sanctioned by 
seetion 6705 of the Financial Code.3 
Great Western agreed to make the necessary construction 
loans to Conejo only after assuring itself that the homes 
2In 1961 the statute was amended to allow savings and loan associa-
tions to lend up to 70 percent of tIle appraised value of unimproved 
property. 
8In 1959 section 6705 read in part: "An association may invest in 
real property and such investment may include subdividing and develop· 
ing real property and building homes and other buildings on such prop· 
erty principally for residentin I use by veterans on such property. An 
association may own, rent, lease, m:lnagp, operntc for in('olllc, or sell such 
property.' , 
) 
860 CONNOR V. GREAT WESTERN SAV. & LOAN ASSN. [69 C.2d 
eould be successfully built and sold. During the negotiations 
lin the terms of the contemplated construction loans to 
COIH'jo and the long-tprm loans to bc offered to the buyers of 
humps in the proposed developmcnt, Great Western investi-
glltpd Goldberg's financial condition and learned that it was 
weak. Moreover, Great 'Vest ern received, without comment or 
inquiry, an August 1959 financial statement from Conejo 
that set forth capital of $325,000, of which $320,000 was 
accounted for as estimated profits from the sales of homes 
when the sales transactions, then in escrow, were completed. 
Such an entry was far outside the bounds of generally 
accepted accounting principles. The estimated profits, repre-
senting 64/65 of the total purported capital, were not only 
hypothetical, but were hypothesized on the basis of houses 
that had not yet been constructed. 
Great Western delved no deeper into the proposed founda-
tions of the houses than into the conjectural bases of 
Conejo's capital. It did require Conejo to submit plans and 
Npeeifications for the various models of homes to be built, cost 
breakdowns, a list of proposed subcontractors and the type of 
work each was to perform, and a sclledule of proposed prices. 
Conejo, which at no time employed an architect, purchased 
plans and specifications from a Mr_ L. C. Majors that he had 
prcpared for other developments, and submitted them to 
Oreat Western. 
Great Western departed from its normal procedure of 
reviewing and approving plans and specifications before mak-
ing a commitment to provide construction funds. It did not 
pXllmine the foundation plans and did not make any recom-
mendations as to the design or construction of the houses. It 
was preoccupied with selling prices and sales. It suggested 
increases in Goldberg's proposed selling prices, which he 
aecepted. It also refused any formal commitment of funds to 
COJlcjo until a specified number of houses were pre-sold, 
namely, sold before they were constructed. 
Prospective buyers reserved lots after inspecting three 
landscaped and furnished model homes standing on 1.6 acres 
of the otherwise barren tract. The model homesites as well as 
a 60-foot wide access road had been granted by the McReas 
dirpctly to Conejo "without consideration and as all accom-
modation " two weeks before the close of the land-purchase 
escrows.· 
4The record does not disclose the source of the $111,000 supplied by 
('ollcjo t.o builc1 nnd lanc1sr.apc the model homes. A permanent loan cover-
illll' the cost of construction was eventually received from Great Western. 
I 
) 
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When Conejo sold the lots, its sales agents informed tIle 
buyers that Great Western was willing to make long-term 
loans secured by first trust deeds to approved per:,;ow" and 
obtailll·d credit information for later submission to Great 
Western. This procedure was dictated by the right of first 
refusal that Conejo agreed to give Great 'Western to obtain 
the construction loans. If an approved buyer wished to obtain 
a long. term loan elsewhere, Great 'Vestern had 10 days to 
meet the terms of the proposed financing; if it met the terms 
and the loan was not placed with Great Western, Goldberg, 
Brown, and South Gate were required to pay Great Western 
the fees and interest obtained by the other lender in connec· 
tion with' the loan. Most of the buyers of homes in the 
Weathersfield tract applied to Great Western for loans. They 
obtained approximately 80 percent of the purchase price in 
the form of 24-year'loans from Great Western at 6.6 percent 
interest secured by first trust deeds. Great Western charged 
Conejo a 1 percent fee for loans made to qualified buyers, 
and a 17'2 percent fee for loans made to Conejo on behalf of 
buyers who, in Great Western's opinion, were poor risks. 
By September, the specified number of houses had been 
reserved by buyers, and Great Western accordingly made 
approximately $3,000,000 in construction loans to Conejo. 
Conejo agreed to pay Great Western a 5 percent construction 
loan fee and 6.6 percent interest on the construction loans as 
disbursed for six months and thereafter on the entire 
amount. Great Western had originally demanded 6.6 percent 
interest on the entire amount without regard to the disburse· 
ment of the funds, and its 5 percent loan fee was higher than 
normal because it asses8ed the loan as one involving a sub· 
stantial risk. When the construction loaDS were recorded, 
Conejo became entitled to advances on the loans and to 
"land draws," lump sums calculated as a percentage of the 
value of the land. Conejo received advances on the construe. 
tion loans and land draws in the sum of $148,200. It turned 
this sum together with $31,800 over to South Gate, which in 
turn paid the total of $180,000 back to Great Western in the 
exercise of its option to repurchase the loo-acre tract from 
Great Western. South Gate simultaneously transferred the 
land to Conejo. 
Conejo accepted notes secured by second trust deed8 from 
the buyers of homes for the balance of the purellase priee 
that was not provided by Great Western. Goldberg planned 
to discount the notes at 50 percent of their face value and to 
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use the proceeds to pay the interest and fees to Great West-
ern and provide a profit to Conejo. The evidence indicates, 
however, that in his enthusiasm to develop the first 100 acres 
of his projected community, Goldberg pared estimated profits 
to the dangerously thin margin of $500 per house, and that 
he exceeded his depth in expertise and finances, with a result-
ing deterioration in his financial position as construction 
progressed. Conejo ultimately pledged the notes as security 
for a $300,000 loan, 43 percent of their face value, forfeiting 
profits in the urgent need for ·liquid capital. This loan was 
obtained from cross-complainants Meyer Pritkin et a1. scven 
business acquaintances of Goldberg who at his suggestion 
organized a joint venture in December 1959 to purchase 382 
acres of land in the Conejo Valley. 
A subcontractor employed by Conejo began grading the 
property before Great Western made a final commitment to 
provide construction loan funds, and while Great Western 
still nominally owned the land. During the course of con-
struction, Great Western's inspectors visited the property 
weekly to verify that the pre-packaged plans were being fol-
lowed and that money was disbursed only for work com-
pll,ted. Under the loan agreement, if construction work did 
not conform to plans and specifications, Great Western had 
the right to withllOld disbursement of funds until the work 
was satisfactorily performed; failure to correct a nonconform-
ity within 15 days constituted a default. Representatives of 
Great Western remained in constant communication with the 
developers of the Weathersfield tract until aU the houses 
were completed and sold in mid-1960. 
The evidence establishes without conflict that there was no 
express agreement either written or oral creating a joint ven-
ture or joint enterprise rplationship between Great Western 
and Conejo or Goldberg. Without exception the testimony of 
t.he principal witnesses discloses specific disclaimers of all 
intention that any such relationship should exist, and the 
written documents provided only for typical option and pur-
chase agreements and loan and security transactions. Plain-
tiffs contend, however, that the evidence of the conduct of the 
parties demonstrates that neither the documents nor the tes-
timony as to the parties' intentions accurately reflect their 
legal relationsllip. They assert that such cvidence of conduct 
supports an inf('renee that a joint venture or joint enterprise 
T(>latiollsliip (>xisted. (See ~iv. node, § ]621; Ulli1'e1·.~al Ral('.~ 
Corp. v. Califm'lIia l"'ess Mfg. Co. (]942) 20 Cal.2d 75], 7G4-
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745, 749-750 [177 P.2d 931] ; Holtz v. United Plumbing d'; 
Heating Co. (1957) 49 Cal.2d 501, 506-507 [319 P.2d 617].) 
[2] A joint venture exists when there is "an agreement 
between the parties under which they have a commwlity of 
interest, that is, a joint interest, in a common business under-
taking, an understanding as to the sharing of profits anu 
losses, and a right of joint control." (Holtz v. United 
Plumbing & Heating Co., supra, 49 Cal.2d 501, 506-507. See 
also Nelson v. Abraham, supra, 29 Cal.2d 745, 749 j Spier v. 
Lang (1935) 4 Ca1.2d 711, 716 [53 P.2d 138] ; Quinn v. Rec-
reation Park Assn. (1935) 3 Ca1.2d 725, 728 [46 P.2d 144].) 
[3] Although the evidence establishes that Great Western 
and Conejo combined their property, skill, and knowledge to 
carry out the tract development, that each shared in the con-
trol of the development, that each anticipated receiving sub-
stantial profits therefrom, and that they cooperated with each 
other in the development, there is no evidence of a commu-
nity or joint interest in the undertaking. Great Western par-
ticipated as a buyer and seller of land and lender of funds, 
and Conejo participated as a builder and seller of homes. 
Although the profits of each were dependent on the oyerall 
success of the development, neither was to share in the profits 
or the losses that the other might realize or suffer. Although 
each received substantial payments as seller, lender, or bor-
rower, neither had an interest in the payments received by 
the other.1I Under these circumstances, no joint venture 
existed. (See Wallace v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co. (1930) 105 
Cal.App. 664, 667 [288 P. 834]; Martin v. Ajax Constr. Co. 
(1954) 124 Cal.App.2d 425, 433 [269 P.2d 132]; Enos v. 
Picacho Gold Min. Co. (1943) 56 Cal.App.2d 765, 770-772 
[133 P.2d 663]; United Farmers Assn. v. Sakiota (1935) 7 
Cal.App.2d 559, 560 [46 P.2d 770] j Sedia v. Elkins (1962) 
201 Cal.App.2d 440, 451 [20 Cal.Rptr. 278]; Nichols, Joint 
Venturers (1950) 36 Va.L.Rev. 425, 438-439. Cf. Martter v. 
Byers (1946) 75 Cal.App.2d 375, 384 [171 P.2d 101] ; Lasry 
v. Lederman (1957) 147 Cal.App.2d 480, 486 [305 P.2d 663] ; 
Stilwell v. Trutanich (1960) 178 Cal.App.2d 614, 620 [3 Cal. 
Rptr.285].)· 
IIWe need not consider plaintiffs' contention that some of the testimony 
of Judge Alfred Gitelson, Goldberg's former counsel in real property 
matters, was improperly struck from the record; consideration of the 
testimony would not alter the conclusion that there is no evidence of n 
community or joint interest in the undcrtaking. 
UFoI' the same reasons, the evidence is insufficient to support an infer-
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[4] Even though Great Western is not vicariously liable 
as a joint venturer for the negligence of Conejo, there re-
mains the question of its liability for its own lIegligence. 
Great Western voluntarily undertook business relation-
ships with South Gate and Conejo to develop the Weath-
ersfield tract and to develop a market for the tract houses in 
which prospective buyers would be directed to Great Western 
for their financing. In undertaking these relationships, Great 
Western became much more than a lender content to lend 
money at interest on the security of real property. It became 
an active participant ill a home construction enterprise. It 
had the right to exercise extensive control of the enterprise. 
Its financing, which made the enterprise possible, took on 
ramifications beyond the domain of the usual money lender. 
It received not only interest on its construction loans, but 
also substantial fees for making them, a 20 percent capital 
gain for "warehousing" the land, and protection from loss 
of profits in the event individual home buyers sought per-
manent financing elsewhere. 
Since the value of the security for the construction loans 
and thereafter the security for the' permanent financing loans 
depended on the construction of s6und homes, Great Western 
was clearly under a duty of care to its shareholders to exer-
cise its powers of control over the enterprise to prevent the 
construction of defective homes. Judged by the standards 
governing nonsuits, it negligently failed to discharge that 
duty. It knew or should have known that the developers were 
inexperienced, undercapitalized, and operating on a dan-
gerously thin capitalization. It therefore knew or should have 
known that damage from attempts to cut corners in construc-
tion was a risk reasonably to be foreseen. (See Lefcoe & 
Dobson, Savings Associations as Land Developers (1966) 75 
Yale L .• T. 127], ]293.)7 It knew or should have known of the 
sometimes used interchangeably with" joint venture" and sometimes to 
describe a nonprofit undertaking for the mutual benefit or pleasure of 
tile parties. (See Shook v. Beals (1950) 96 CaI.App.2d 963, 967-968 [217 
P.2d 56, 18 A.L.R.2d 9]9]; 2 Williston, Contracts (3d cd. 1959) § 318, 
pp. 554-555.) When used to dcscribe a business or eommereial under-
taking, however, California decisions draw no significant distinctions 
between joint ventures and joint enterprises. (See, e.g., ]Joyd v. White 
(1954) 128 Cal.App.2d 641, 657 [276 P.2d 92]; Larson v. Lewis-Simas· 
Jones Co. (1938) 29 Cal.App.2d 83, 89 [84 P.2d 296]; Ambrose v. 
Alioto (1944) 65 Cal.App.2d 362, 366 [150 P.2d 502].) 
7For example, Goldberg refuscd to follow the suggestion of soil engi-
neers that Conejo comply with FHA grading standards requiring all 
llOmes to drain to the street, because the cost would be an extra $200 
per lot. 
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expansive soil problem,s and yet it failed to require soil tests, 
to examine foundation plans, to recommend changes in the 
pre-packaged plans and specifications, or to recommend 
.changes in the foundations during construction. It made no 
attempt to discover gross structural defects that it could haw 
discovered by reasona.ble inspection and that it would have 
required Conejo to remedy. It relied for protection solel~' 
upon building inspectors with whom it had had no experience 
to enforce a building code with the provisions of which it was 
ignorant. The crucial question remains whether Great West-
ern also owed a duty to the home buyers in the Weathersfield 
tract and was therefore also negligent toward them. 
[5&] The fact that Great Western was not in privity of 
contract with any of the plaintiffs except as a lender does not 
absolve it of liability for its own negligence in creating an 
unreasonable risk of harm to tIl em. [6] "Privity of con-
tract is not necessary to establish the existence of a duty to 
exercise ordinary care . not to injure another, but such duty 
may arise out of a voluntarily assumed relationship if pub-
lic policy dictates the ¢xistence of such a duty." (Merrill v. 
Buck (1962) 58 Ca1.2d 552, 561-562 [25 Cal.Rptr. 456, 375 
P.2d 304]. See, e.g., Biakanja v. Irving (1958) 49 Cal.2d 647, 
650 [320 P,2d 16, 65 A.L.R.2d 1358] ; Lucas v. Hamm (1961) 
56 Cal.2d 583, 588 [15 Cal.Rptr. 821, 364 P.2d 685] ; Stewart 
v. Cox (1961) 55 Cal.2d 857, 863 [13 CalRptr. 521, 362 P.2d 
345].) [7] The basic tests for determining the existence of 
such a duty are clearly set forth in Biakanja v. Irving, 
.8upra, 49 Cal.2d 647, 650, as follows: "The determination 
whether in a specific ease the defendant will be held liable to 
a third person not in privity is a matter of policy and 
involves the balancing of various factors, among which are 
[1] the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect 
the plaintiff, [2] the foreseeability of harm to him, [3] the 
degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, [4] the 
closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct 
and the injury suffered, [5] the moral blame attached to the 
defendant's conduct, and [6] the policy of prevcnting future 
harm." 
SAdobe soil is common in southern California. Tests conducted by 
Conejo's soil engineers indicated the presence of adobe soil. Such soil is 
distinguished easily by the naked eye in dry weather in areas where the 
ground cover is sparse; when it dries and contracts, the surface crael{s 
into plates, frequently hexagonal in shape and 10 or 12 inches in diam-
eter. Several Conejo employees noticed the cbaracteristic cracks during 
the summer of 1959, as did the geologist hired by Great Western to 
investigate water supply problems . 
• c.Jd-II 
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[5b] In the light of the foregoing tests Great Western 
was clearly under a duty to the buyers of the homes to exer-
cise reasonable eare to protect them from damages caused by 
major structural defects. 
[8] [1] Great Western's transactions were intended to 
affect the plaintiffs significantly. 
The success of Great Western's transactions with South 
Gate and Conejo depended entirely upon the ability of the 
parties to iuduce plaintiffs to buy homes in the Weathersfield 
tract and to finance the purchases with funds supplied by 
Great Western. Great Western's agreement to supply' funds 
to Conejo to build homes in return for a 5 percent construc-
tion loan fee and 6.6 percent interest, was on condition that a 
sufficient number of persons first made commitments to buy 
homes. Great Western agreed to warellOuse land for Conejo 
on tIle understanding that the land would be used for a 
residential subdivision. Great 'Vestern also stipulated that 
advances from its construction loans would be used by 
Conejo to exercise repurchase options, thereby affording 
Great Western the opportunity for a $30,000 capital gain. 
Finally, Great Western took steps to have Conejo channel 
buyers of homes to its doors for loans, extracting a 1 percent 
loan fee from Conejo in the process. 
[9] [2] Great Western could reasonably have foreseen 
the risk of harm to plaintiffs. 
Great 'Vestern knew or SllOUld have known that neither 
Goldberg nor Brown had ever developed a tract of similar 
magnitude. Great Western knew or should have known that 
Conejo was operating on a dangerously thin capitalization, 
creating a readily foreseeable risk that it would be driven to 
cutting corners in construction. That risk was enlarged still 
further by the additional pressures on Conejo ensuing from 
its onerous burdens as a borrower from Great Western. 
[10] [3] It is certain that plaintiffs suffered injury. 
Counsel stipulated that eaell of tllC plaintiff homeowners, if 
called, would testify that their respect.ive homes sust.ained 
damage in varying degrees "of the cllaracter of which we 
have been concerned in this action." Sufficient evidence was 
presented to show by way of example the existence of damage 
to the homes and therefore injury to plaintiffs. Under the 
terms of t.he pretrial order, the extent of each plaintiff's 
injury is to be litigated in further proceedings after the ques-
tion of Great Western's liabilit.y is determined. 
) 
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[11] [4] The injury suffered by plaintiffs was clDsely CDn-
nected with Great Western's conduct. 
Great 'Vestern nDt .only financed the develDpment .of the 
Weathersfield tract but cDntrolled the CDurse it wDuld take. 
Had it exercised reasonable care in the exercise .of its control, 
it wDuld have discDvered that the pre-packaged plans pur-
chased by ConejD required cDrrectiDn and would have with-
held financing until the plans were cDrrected.s 
[12] [5] Substantial moral blame attaches to Great West-
ern's CDnduct. 
The value .of the security for Great 'Vestern's constructiDn 
IDans as well as the prDjected security fDr its IDng-term loans 
to plantiffs depended on the soundness .of construction. Great 
Western failed of its obligation to its own shareholders whell 
it failed to exercise reasonable care to preclude majDr at l"Ue-
tural defects in the hDmes whDse constructiDn it financed and 
contrDlled. It alsD failed of its obligation to the buyers, tllC 
mDre so because it was well aware that the usual buyer of a 
home is ill-equipped with experience or financial means to 
discern such structural defects. (Cf. Schipper v. Levitt &-
Sons, Inc. (1965) 44 N.J. 70 [207 A.2d 314, 325-326].) More-
over a hDme is nDt .only a majDr investment fDr the usual 
buyer but also the .only shelter he has. Hence it beCDmes 
doubly impDrtant to prDtect him against structural defects 
that could prove beyond his capacity tD remedy. 
[13] [6] The admDnitory pDlicy of the law .of torts calls 
for the impDsition of liability .on Great Western fDr its CDn-
duct in this case. Rules that tend to discourage miscDnduct 
are particularly appropriate when applied tD an established 
industry. 
[5c] By all the fDregDing tests, Great Western had a duty 
to exercise reasDnable care tD prevent the cDnstruction and 
sale .of seriDusly defective hDmes to plaintiffs. The CDuntervail-
ing cDnsiderations invDked by Great Western and amici curiae 
are that the impDsitiDn .of the duty in question upon a lender 
will increase hDusing cDSts, drive marginal builders .out .of 
business, and decrease tDtal hDusing at a time .of great need. 
These are cDnjectural claims. In any eYent, there is no endur-
SThe vice-president in charge of Great Western's tract loan develop-
ment aetivities testified that had Great Western known of the soil con-
dition it would have required soil tests and the correction of plans he fore 
approving a construction 101m. Alt.hough Cone.io h:\(l the right to seele 
nnotller lender at any time to continue as finaneier of the projec·t, t.het·o 
is no reason to assume that such lender would not have exercised rl'USOIl-
able care and imposed similar requhcmeuts. 
) 
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ing social utility in fostering the construction of seriously 
defective homes. If reliable construction is the norm, the 
recognition of a duty on the part of tract financiers to home 
buyers should not materially increase the cost of housing or 
drive small builders out of business. to If existing sanctions 
are inadequate, imposition of a duty at the point of effective 
financial control of tract building will insure responsible 
building practices.l1 Moreover, in either event the losses of 
family savings invested in seriously defective homes would be 
devastating cconomic blows if no redress were available. 
Defendants contend, however, that the question of their lia-
bility is one of policy, and hence should be resolved only by 
the J~egislature after a marshalling of. relevant economic and 
flocial data. There is no assurance, however, that the Legisla-
ture will undertake such a task, even though tract financing 
grows apace, [14] In the absence of actual or prospective 
legislative policy, the court is free to resolve the case before it, 
and indeed must resolve it in terms of common law. 
[15] Great Western contends that lending institutions 
have relied on an assumption of nonliability and hence that a 
rulc imposing liability should operate prospectively only. In 
the past, judicial decisions have been limited to prospective 
operation when they overruled earlier decisions upon which 
parties had reasonably relied and when considerations of fair-
)less and public policy precluded retroactive effect. (Forster 
Shipbuilding Co. v. Oounty of Los Angeles (1960) 54 Cal.2d 
450, 458-459 [6 Cal.Rptr. 24, 353 P.2d 736].) Conceivably 
lOIn 1965 a state legislative committee found that hundreds of homes 
built upon expansive Boil in California had cracked to such an extent as 
to make continued habitation uncomfortable or unsafe, that the existence 
of such soil could be casily and chcaply identified, that the cost of engi-
neering solutions wall miuimal and casily financcd by the builder and 
1I0mcbuyer, and that "local ordinances requiring soil analysis prior to 
lIome construction are virtually nonexistent," leaving the potential home-
lJUyer "without minimium allSul'ance thnt his purchase will be a safe 
IIlId habitablc home." (6 Assembly Interim Com_ Report No. 21, Munic-
ipal and County Government (1965) p. 9, "Problems of Construction 
Upon Expansive Soil. ") In 1965 soil analysis and precautionary meas-
ures were required by state statute. (Health & Sat. Code, 1117953, 
17954.) 
lIThe residential construction industry is composed principally of 
small builders, most of whom have so little equity that they must borrow 
money in order to finance the production of new homes. (See Gillies and 
1Ifittelbaell, Managl'ment in the Light Construction Industry (1962) 
I'p. 1;)·16, 19, 2]; Gillies & Curtis, Illstitutiollfil Residential Mortgage 
Lending in Los Angeles County (1956) pp. 41·42.) Savings and lonn 
nsso(,iatiolls lire bound hy markt·t fOl'rcs anti legal restraints to be a major 
.mpJllil'r of funds to MilCh slDall hui hlers. (I.efcue and ])uuHon, 8'Itp"U, 
';5 Yale L.J. 1271, 1284·1286.) 
! . 
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such a limitation migbt also be justified when tllere appeared 
to be a general consensus that there would be no extension of 
liability. Such is not the case here. At least since MacPherson 
v. Buick Motor Co. (1916) 217 N.Y. 382 [111 N.E. 1050, 
L.R.A. 1916F 696], there has been a steady expansion of 
liability for harm caused by the failure of defendants to exer-
cise reasonable care to protect others from reasonably foresee-
able risks. (See generally Prosser, The Law of Torts (3d ed. 
1964) ch. 19.) By the time of the decision in Sabella Y. Wisler 
(1963) 59 Ca1.2d 21 [27 Cal.Rptr. 689, 377 P.2d 889], such 
liability had been imposed on a builder who negligently con-
structed a seriously defective home. (See also Stewart v. Cox, 
supra, 55 Cal.2d 857.) Those in the business of financing tract 
builders could therefore reasonably foresee the possibility that 
they might be under It duty to exercise their power over tract 
developments to protE'ct home buyers from seriously defective 
construction. Moreover. since the value of their own security 
depends on the constrndion of sound homes, they have always 
been under a duty to their shareholders to exercise reasonable 
care to prevent the construction of defective llOmes. Given 
that traditional duty of care, a lending institution should 
have been farsighted enough to make such provisions for 
potential liability as would enable it to withstand the effects 
of a decision of normal retrospective effect. 
[16&] Great Western contends finally that the negligence 
of Conejo in constructing the homes and the negligence of tIle 
county building inspectors in approving the construction were 
superseding causes that insulate it from liability. Conejo's 
negligence could not be a superseding cause, for th~ risk that 
it might occur was the primary hazard that gave rise to Great 
Western's duty. [17] ", If the realizable likelihood that a 
third person may act in a particular manner is the hazard or 
one of the hazards which makes the actor negligent, such an 
act whether innocent, negligent, intentionally tortious or 
criminal does not prevent the actor from being liable for harm 
caused thereby,''' (Richardson v. Ham (1955) 44 Ca1.2d 
772, 777 [285 P.2d 269], quoting Rest. Torts, § 449; see also 
Rest.2d Torts, § 449; Weaver v. Bank of America (1963) 
59 Ca1.2d 428, 433-434 [30 Cal.Rptr. 4, 380 P.2d 644].) 
[16b] The negligence of the building inspectors, confined as it 
. was to inspection, could not serve to diminish, let alone spirit 
away, the negligence of the lender. Great Western's duty to 
plaintiffs was to exercisc reasonable care to protect them from 
seriously defective construction whether caused by defective 
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plans, defective inspection, or both, and its argument that 
thcre was a superseding cause of the harm "is answered by the 
srttlrd rule that two separate nets of negligence may be the 
t'Olwmring proximate causes of an injury. (Fennessey v. 
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 20 Ca1.2d 141, 145 [124 P.2d 51] ; 
Lacy v. Pacific Gas ((; Elec. Co., 220 Cal. 97, 98 [29 P.2d 
78]]; ... )" (Merrill v. Buck, supra, 58 Cal.~d 552, 563.) 
[18] The question remains whether granting a nonsuit in 
favor of Great Western against cross-complainants" was also 
erroneous. As pledgees of promissory notes secured by second 
deeds of trust, cross-complainants seek to hold Great Western 
liable for the impairment to their security caused by the dam-
nge to the homes and to impose liens on any recovery plain-
tiffs may obtain from Great Western or other defendants. By 
stipulation and pretrial order the parties agreed that the issue 
of Grcat Western's liability should be determined first and 
that thereafter the rights and liabilities of the other parties 
am01lg themselves should be determined. The question whether 
cross-complainants are entitled to liens on any recoveries 
plaintiffs may obtain from Great Western has therefore not 
yet been litigated. (Cf. American 8av. & Loan Assn. v. Leeds 
(1968) 68 Cal.2d 611 [68 Cal.Rptr. 453, 440 P.2d 933].) 
Accordingly, it was error to grant a nonsuit against cross-
complainants as well as against plaintiffs, for in further pro-
ceedings cross-complainants may be able to establish some 
basis for sharing in plaintiffs' recoveries. 
[19] For the purposes of such proceedings, however, we 
also hold that Great Western owed no independent duty of 
(~are to cross-complainants. The balance of the factors set 
forth in the Biakanja case is significantly different when an 
investor in or pledgee of notes secured by second deeds of 
trust is substituted for a member of the home-buying public as 
tll!' party claiming a duty of care on the part of the tract 
financier. Although some factors may indicate no difference 
between plaintiffs and cross-complainants insofar as Great 
Western's duties are concerned, others point toward a duty to 
plaintiffs but not toward a duty to cross-complainants. 
'fhe foreseeability of harm to cross-complainants as a result 
of defective construction was substantially less than in the 
case of plaintiffs. As security cross-complainants had notes 
from the home owners as well as second deeds of trust. Fur-
thermore, they assured themselves of a substantial margin of 
safety against the risk that the notes would not be paid or 
that the homes would be worth less than the purchase price 
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when they lent only 43 percent of the face value of the notes. 
Plaintiffs, on the other hand, were powerless to protect their 
equities in their homes from reduction or extinction by dimi-
nution of the value of the property as a result of defective 
construction. 
Likewise, Great Western's negligence was more closely con-
nected with plaintiffs' injuries than cross-complainants' 
injuries. Plaintiffs were injured by the diminution of value of 
their homes as a result of defective construction. Cross-
complainants will be injured only if plaintiffs default on their 
notes and the diminution in value of the homes leaves insuffi-
cient security to protect the second trust deeds. 
Finally, substantially less moral blame attached to Great 
Western's conduct with respect to cross-complainants than 
attached to its conduct with respect to plaintiffs. The roles 
played by cross-complainants and plaintiffs in the transaction 
were crucially different. Like Great \Vestern itself, cross-
complainants were investors in a business enterprise and dealt 
with Conejo as creditors, not as purchasers of the homes it 
built. As substantial creditors of Conejo, cross-complainants 
were voluntary co-participants with Great \Vestern and 
Conejo in the enterprise of building and selling homes tll the 
general public. Cross-complainants did not have Great West-
ern's power to prevent defective construction through control 
of construction loan payments; but, unlike plaintiffs, who had 
no practical alternative to accepting Conejo's qualifications 
and responsibility on faith, cross-complainants as substantial 
investors were in a position to protect themselves.12 Under 
these circumstances, we do not believe that either Great 
Western or cross-complainants were under a duty to exercise 
reasonable care to protect the other from negligence on the 
part of Conejo. Accordingly, Great Western's duty to exer-
cise reasonable care to prevent Conejo from constructing 
defective homes was limited to the members of the public who 
bought those homes. 
The parties stipulated that the homes of plaintiffs Elwood 
and Evelyn Guest and plaintiffs John and Grace \Vhitaker 
12Goldberg's accountant is one of four cross-complainants who are 
co-partners doing business as Pritkin-Finkel Investment Company. He 
testified that the partnership made investments on the advice of account· 
ing elients without previous investigation, that it had made approximately 
a dozen investments in the last several years totalling less than a millioll 
dollars, and that. tile deals in which it had invested involved total dollar 
amounts of approximately one hundred million dollars. Goldberg's former 
counsel in real property matters is one of two cross· complainants who are 
co-partners doing business as K. G. & Company. 
) 
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are not located in tract 1158, 1159, or 1160. As to them, the 
nonsuit is affirmed. In all other respects the judgment is 
reversed. 
Peters, J., Tobriner, J., and Sullivan, J., concurred. 
MOSK, J.-I dissent. 
The evidence is overwhelming, and the majority concede, 
that as between the lender of funds and the tract developer 
tllere was no agency, no joint venture, no joint enterprise. It 
is clear there was merely a lender-borrower relationship. Nev-
ertheless, the majority here hold the lender of funds vicari-
ously liable to third parties for the negligence of the 
borrower. This result is (a) unsupported by statute or prece-
dent; (b) incons.istent with accepted principles of tort law; 
(c) likely to be productive of untoward social consequences. 
At the threshold, it would be helpful to review some ele-
m~ntary economic factors and relationships that appear to be 
involved in this proceeding. 
'l'he function of the entrepreneur in a free market is to 
discern what goods or services are in apparent demand and to 
gather and arrange the factors of production in order to sup-
ply to the. consumcr, at a profit, the goods and services 
desired. III so doing, the entrepreneur undertakes a number of 
risks. 'l'he demand may be less than he calculated; the .costs of 
production may be greater. Hc is not only in danger of losing 
llis own capital investment but he incurs obligations. to the 
suppliers of land, materials, labor and capital, and he stands 
liable under now-accepted principles of law for harm and loss 
caused by defects in his products to those persons injured 
thereby. 
'fhe entrepreneur undertakes these calculated risks in the 
hope of an ultimate substantial monetary reward resulting 
from the return over and above his costs, which include not 
only land, materials and labor but the- charges incurred in 
obtaining capital. Indeed, "profit" has been commonly 
understood to be the return above expcnses to innovators or 
l'ntrepreneurs as the rcward for their innovation and enter-
prise. (People ex reI. Farnum v. San Francisco Sav. Union 
(1887) 72 Cal. 199, 202-203 [13 P. 498].) The upper limit of 
t lie entrepreneur's profit is determined by his success in the 
market, and this results from his skill in assessing the demand 
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Conejo Valley Development Company and a.~sociatccl 
parties were entrepreneurs. 
The role of the supplier of capital is entirely different. The 
lender, as a supplier of capital, is to receive by contraet a 
fixed return or priee for his investment. He owns no right to 
participate in the profits of the enterprise no matter how 
great they may be. On the other hand, he is insulated from 
the risk of loss of capitnl and interest in return for making 
his money available, other than the risk of nonpayment of tIle 
contract obligations. Indeed, it is- elementary that the owner 
of money lends it to an entrepreneur and receives only a fixed 
return, rather than obtaining the gain from using the money 
11imself as an entrepreneur, on the condition that he be 
relieved of risk. The basic, underlying risk in mortgage lend-
ing is that the lender might not get back wllat is owed to him 
in principal and interest. 
It seems abundantly clear, both legally and logically, that if 
the lender has no opportunity to share in the profits or gains 
beyond the fixed return for his supplying of capital, i.e;, if he 
has no chance of reaping the entrepreneur's reward and exer-
cises no control over the entrepreneur's business, elementary 
fairness requires that he should not be subjected to the entrc-
preneur's risks. 
Great Western Savings and Loan Association was a Zender, 
a supplier of capital. 
By imposing the entrepreneur's risks upon the supplier of 
capital, even though the latter has bargained away the oppor-
tunity of participating in the entrepreneurial gain on his cap-
ital by lending it at a fixed fee, the majority have effected a 
drastic restructuring of traditional economic relationships. 
The results may reverberate throughout the economy of our 
state, and may seriously affect the money and investment 
market, the construction industry, and regulatory schemes of 
financial institutions, all without the faintest hint in either 
stautory or case authority that such a draconian result is 
compelled. 
In fact, all available autllOrity points to a contrary result. 
"The obvious drawback of the negligencc solution [to this 
problem] is the lack of legal precedent for imposing such a 
duty upon the lending institution." Lender Liability /01' 
Housing Defects (1968) 35 U.Chi.L.Rev. 739, 758. As Justice 
Carter wrote in Routh v. Quinn (1942) 20 Ca1.2d 488, 491 
[127 P.2d 1, 149 A.L.R. 215] ; "It is an elementary principle 
that an indispensable factor to liability founded upon negli. 
--) 
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gence is the existence of a duty of care owed by the alleged 
wrongdoer to the person injured, or to a class of which he is a 
member." And in Dahms v. General Elevator Co. (1932) 214 
Cal. 733, 737 [7 P.2d 1013], it was also said to be "elemen-
tary, of course, that no tortious liability can be imposed on a 
defendant eve1i though it was negligent, unless defendant 
owed a duty of eare to plaintiff." (Italics added.) Without 
such a duty, any injury is as to this defendant damnum 
absque injuria. (2 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (1960) 
'}'orts. § 4.) The remedy is, as it should be, against the negli-
gent builder. 
It has never been doubted that the imposition of a duty 
implies significant control over the agency of harm. The issue 
()f right of control goes to the very heart of the ascription of 
tortious responsibility, particularly where the alleged negli-
gf'nt conduct is asserted to be a failure to control the conduct 
of an independent third party. 
In the absence of a special relationship a party has no duty 
to control the conduct of a third person, so as to prevent him 
from causing harm to another. (Richards v. Stanley (1954) 43 
Cal.2d 60, 65 [271 P.2d 23] ; Puller v. Standard Stations, Inc. 
(1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 687 [58 Cal.Rptr. 792].) No authority 
holds that lender-borrower is the type of relationship contem-
plating the duty of control over the conduct of another so as 
to prevent injury to third parties. 
The J.<'inancial Code, which contains California statutory 
rules governing the operations of institutional lenders, creates 
no duty of care by those institutions to any parties other than 
their shareholders and depositors, and, of course, to govern-
mental regulatory agencies. Indeed, the majority point out 
that "Great Western was clearly under a duty of care to its 
shareholders to exereise its powers of control over the enter-
prise to prevent the construction of defective homes. Judged 
by tl\{~ standards goyerning non suits. it negligently failed to 
discharge that duty." (Italics added.) That duty, the only 
(lut.', d('lill('ateo. in the majority opinion, was care to its share-
11Olders. Assuming arguendo that negligence to shareholders is 
)"rfl!'ctrd in the evio.rnee, no cause of aetion by these plaintiffs 
is stated for the obvious reason that they were not Great 
'Vesterll shareholders, and thus no duty was owed to them. In 
Gill v. Mission Sav. & Loan Assn. (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d 753 
[46 Cal.Rptr. 456], the court held that a savings and loan 
association owed no duty of care to holders of promissory 
notes and subordinated trust deeds with respect to supervision 
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and management of construction loan funds. There, as here, it 
was not alleged or proved "that the defendant agreed with 
anyone to manage or supervise distribution of the loaned 
funds, assumed to do so, actually undertook such, or was 
required by statutory law or regulation to so manage or 
supervise. Nor is there any showing of a voluntarily assunlpd 
relationship between defendant and plaintiffs from which such 
an obligation might arise." (Pp. 756-757.) 
The evidence is barren of indicia that the defendants main-
tained any element of control over the enterprise involved 
here. The record establishes without conflict that Great \Vest-
ern and Conejo had no mutual right to direct each 01h£'r's 
activities. The fact that Great Western was required by law 
(Fin. Code, § 7156) to limit its rate of disbursements to the 
borrower cannot import a duty to the ultimate purchaser and 
is not the equivalent of a right to control the progress of 
development or to participate in the management of thp bor-
rower's enterprise. By regUlating disbursements the lender 
may to some extent affect the borrower, but this is far 
removed from control over the borrower's business and from 
an affirmative duty to prevent the borrower's negligence 
toward third parties. 
Actual control or an implied agreement to control construc-
tion is a factual question, decided against the plaintiffs here 
by the trier of fact. Before the written loan contract between 
the lender and the developer was signed and before the plans 
were approved, the lender could have exercised "cont rol ' , 
over the building project only by insisting on changes in tlw 
foundation plans as a condition of making the loan. In this 
respect, the lender here is in no' different position than any 
other lender and exercised no greater "control" over the 
building project than any other lender who can. if he wis\lPs, 
withhold funds if he believes the funds will be used in a 
harmful manner. 
Whether the lender should be under a duty to conduct an 
independent investigation to discover defects in the plans is 
an entirely different matter. The ma.jority conclude that this 
duty should be imposed on the lender here because it lweI 
control of the construction enterprise. Upon analysis, 110W-
ever, it is clear t.hat tl1is control was mythical; it. consisted 
merely of the power to refuse to lend money for the projN·t. 
In this respect all I£'nd('l's may be held to "control" til,> 
projt'cts they timmct'. Therein lies the vice of the majO/'ity 
opinion. 
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As to the" eontrol" exercised by Great Western after con-
struction began, the only right it had under the contract was 
t{) withhold funds if the work did not conform to the plans. 
The inspections conducted by it were performed for this pur-
pose and to comply with the statutory requirements concern-
ing disbursement of funds. Thus, if the foundation plans 
appeared defective, thc lender had no right under the contract 
to insist upon their revision. 
Great Western's position, as indicated above, was no differ-
ent from that of any other lender: it had no contractual or 
statutory right w conduct the operations of the builder-
borrower. Even if it were to be established that Great Western 
was negligent in its duty to its own shareholders by ('xtendiug 
loans w a builder of dubious competence, this did not set in 
motion the subsequent relationship of the builder to the third 
parties, and thc builder's superseding n<>gligencc insulates 
Great \V<>stcrn from liability for wllatever negligence resulted 
from merely lending money. "If the accident would have llap-
pened anyway, whether the defendant was negligent or not, 
then his negligence was not a cause ill fact, and of coursc 
cannot be the legal or responsible cause." (2 Witkin, Sum-
mary of Cal. Law (1960) Torts, § 284, p. 1484.) 
In short, neither the identity of the lender nor the t<>rllls of 
the loan had any effect whatever upon the builder's ultiml1te 
negligence. The lending of money cannot be said to havc 
created a possibility of harm to third parties. The produciug 
institution, here the builder, created the risk, controlled the 
agency of harm, and thus was the actor under a duty to 
minimize the risk. The defects in home construction were not 
eaused by the lending of mOlH'Y; thpy were an incident of thc 
process of physical construction. 
The majority assert tIle lender knew or should have known 
the developers were inexperienced and undercapitalized and 
that thrre wpre soil problrms. Assuming tl)is to be so. the 
lendrr may }1/1Ve been remiss in its duty to its shareholders, 
but that conduct is unrelated to the buildl'r's negligence in 
('rrl1ting structural defects which rl'sulted in injury to plain-
tiffs. The dt'fpcts would hn,'c o('l·llI"1'Nl if thc loans wure made 
by defendant, if tllPY werr not llIade by defendant, if they 
wcre made by anothrr ll'nding institution, or if the builders 
used their own rpsourees exelusivl'ly. No relationship, 11ow-
I'vrr tenuons, can be establislic(l hrtwcen the loans and the 
JIl'gligPllce of thc builder. 
The plaintiffs also rely upon tllc I1ppt·nisals and inspeptions 
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with law and were intended to be a means of verifying the 
existence of the construction for which loans had been made, 
and of determining the progress of construction in order to 
regulate the disbursement rate. The appraisals and inspec-
tions were intended only for the benefit of defendant and 
state regulatory authorities. They were never in fact commu-
nicated to outsiders, neither the general public nor the pros-
pective homeowners. They were not used to encourage or 
induce anyone to purchase homes, but were adapted solely as 
tools of internal management. Plaintiffs 1Itrain logic in 
attempting to convert these internal operations of the defend-
ant into representations to them, negligent or otherwise. 
A duty of care is imposed only upon parties creating a risk 
of foreseeable harm. To find that an institutional lender, 
merely by providing capital, creates a risk of foreseeable harm 
in place of or in addition to the borrower who constructs or 
sets the harmful agency in motion, is a novel concept of tort 
law. By parity of reason, a finance company would, by lend-
ing money for the purchase of an automobile, be liable for 
. injuries to third parties caused by the owner's negligent 
operation of the vehicle. 
The majority attempt to adapt the "balancing of various 
factors" in Biakanja v. Irving (1958) 49 Cal.2d 647, 650 
[320 P.2d 16, 65 A.L.R.2d 1358], to the factual circumstances 
here. That their reliance is clearly misplaced is demonstrated 
by an analysis of the six tests of Biakanja to establish liabil-
ity in the absence of privity: 
1. The extent to which the transaction was intended to 
affect pla·intif/. Defendant's conduct, including its appraisals, 
cursory inspections, and the making of loans, was intended 
for its own purposes exclusively, i.e. for the benefit of its 
shareholders and depositors. No representations were made to 
any prospective homeowner and there was no testimony what-
ever indicating any actual or prospective homeowners relied 
on any representations. There can be no question that the 
transaction was intended to affect the lender and the borrow-
er, and was not for the benefit direct or indirect of plaintiffs. 
2. Foreseeability 0/ harm. The issue under this phase of the 
test is the foreseeability of harm resulting from the lender'~ 
actions as distinguished from the conduct of the builder. It is 
scarcely foreseeable by the lender, as a result of simply pro-
viding funds for construction, that gross structural defects 
would exist in the llOmrs ultimately constructed by the 
builder, particularly in a situation in which construction was 
) 
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overseen and approved by the governmental agencies of Ven-
tura County, in which experts submitted reports on construc-
tion problems both to the builder and to the county and in 
which, contrary to the inferences in the majority opinion, the 
builder came highly recommended by another experienced 
lender. There IS a potential risk of structural defects in any 
construction, but it is impossible to find particular for(·seeabil-
ity of construction harm merely from the act of a financial 
inl!ltitution lending money to a builder. 
3. The degree of certainty that tlte plaintiffs suffered 
iniury. We can, for purposes of this discussion, concede that 
plaintiffs suffered injury. The issue is whether liability for 
that injury is to be imposcd on the nearest solvent bystander 
or upon the party whose negligent conduct produced the 
injury. 
4. Oloselress of connection between injury suffered and 
defendant's conduct. The lender here built no homes, drew no 
plans and did 1I0t drive in a single nail. Its function was to 
finance and not to construct. The experience of the institu-
tional lender is in lending money, not in building homes. In 
short, the two enterprises have no "closeness of connection"; 
they are significantly remote. There is no evidence that any 
purchasers knew of thc existence of the defendant in its role as 
lender of construction funds, much less that they relied upon-
any a.ctivity of the lender with regard to the development. 
5. Moral blarne. Blamewortl1iness implies responsibility. The 
lender's only responsibility here was to its shareholders and 
depositors. If any moral blame is to be assessed, it must be by 
tllem and not the plaintiff. 
G. The policy of preventing future harm. Rules of law or 
conduct intended to deter or minimize the risk of future harm 
are imposed only upon those creating aud controlling the risk 
of harm. The only manner in which this policy could apply to 
lenders in the future-and this may be the ultimate result 
of the majority opinion-is by compelling lenders to become 
joint venturers wit.h entrepreneurs. This, as indicated hereto-
forE'. will result in n subshmtinl alteration in the previously 
Ilccepted economic relntionship between lenders and entrepre-
neurial borrowers. 
There appear to be adequate remedies both in law and in 
E'quity for victims of negligent builders. But if home pur-
chasers are not sufficiently protected today in their available 
remedies for latent constructional defects, legislative bodies 
can take appropriate action to revamp building codes, give 
/J ~'-.... ! 
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more power to regulatory agencies, make licensing requirc-
ments more strict, compel bonding of home builders, providc 
for iudustry-wide insurance. The answer does not lie in a 
judicially created cause of action that will compel lending 
institutions to assume a supervisory role in home construction. 
Such a requirement will raise interest rates and the cost of 
money and thus increase the cost of home construction. More 
significantly, it will place supervisory responsibility on insti-
tutions which are limited by law to financing operations and 
therefore ill-equipped with the skilled scientific, mechanical 
and engineering personnel necessary to perform a supervisory 
function effectively. 
For all of the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the judg-
ment. 
BURKE, J.-I dissent. I agree with the Chief Justice that 
despite the extensive activities of Great Western here the evi-
dence, viewed most favorably to plaint.iffs, falls short of estab-
lishing the existence of a joint venture between Great West-
ern and Conejo or Goldberg. However, I would hold 11 joint 
venture relationship to be the only basis for imposing liability 
upon Great Western. Its position vis-a-vis plaintiffs differs 
materially from the relationships between plaintiffs and 
defendants in the four cases upon which the majority opinion 
relies. (MerriU v. Buck (1962) 58 Cal.2d 552, 561-562 [25 
Cal.Rptr. 456, 375 P.2d 304] [defendant real estate agent 
showed and rented to injured plaintiff lessee a house with 
latent dangerous defect] ; Biakanja v. Irv·ing (1958) 49 Cal. 
2d 647, 650 [320 P.2d 16, 65 A.L.R.2d 1358] [defendant 
notary public drew invalid will, thereby depriving plajntiffs 
of intended benefits thereunder); Lucas v. Hamm (1961) 56' 
Cal.2d 583, 588 [15 Cal.Rptr. 821, 364 P.2d 685] [attorney 
charged with drafting will with invalid trust provisions, caus-
ing loss to intended beneficiaries] ; Stewart v. Cox (1961) 55 
Cal.2d 857, 863 [13 Cal.Rptr. 521, 362 P.2d 345] [defendant 
subcontractor installed defective and leaking concrete work 
for swimming pool built for plaintiff] .) 
In each of the cited cases defendant behaved negligently in 
earrying out a duty of care undertaken by de! endant toward 
another. But in the present case Great Western undertook no 
duty toward Conejo, Goldberg. plaintiffs, or anyone else, any 
violation of which resulted ill plaintiffs' losses. The majority 
opinion speaks of a negligent failure by Great Western of 
u a duty of care to its shareholders ... to prevent the con· 
